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ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. NASZKOWSKI

(Poland)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARAIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. J. E. G. HARDY
Mr. J. F. M. BELL
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL
Mr. A. S. MEHTA
Mr. K. K. RAO
Mr. C. K. GAIROLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES

Nigeria:

Mr. A. A. ATTA
Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. J. SLAWINSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. G. A. WESTRING
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V. A. ZORIN
Mr. I. G. USACHEV
Mr. V. N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN
Mr. A. el-TERIAN
Mr. M. S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J. N. LAMBERT
Mr. J. K. WRIGHT
Mr. R. C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A. H. DEAN
Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I declare open the twenty-sixth meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I should like today to comment on two questions which have been under consideration in connexion with the last two discussions here on general and complete disarmament. In the first place I should like to discuss the question of control, and then to turn to the question of reduction of armaments as set forth in the United States draft treaty outline submitted here on 18 April (ENDC/9).

Mr. Zorin dealt quite fully with the question of control at our twenty-first meeting here last week. At that time I noted that the United States paper which has been circulated as "Part I: Objectives and Principles" (ENDC/18) covers some of our ideas on the points dealt with by the Soviet representative in discussing articles 2 and 3, as well as article 1, of the Soviet draft (ENDC/2). I stated that I would reserve my right to comment further at a later date. If my Soviet colleague wishes to go on to discuss article 3 of the Soviet draft treaty, those comments apply to article 3 as well.

Fortunately, in this important question of control, all the delegations here have a commonly agreed starting point defined in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), which was unanimously endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly with the concurrence of all delegations represented at this Conference.

I call attention to this Joint Statement of Agreed Principles because in our view it is so explicit on the matter that many of our differences can be resolved or avoided simply by reference to that document. Our difficulties seem proportionate to the degree to which we depart from this original source.

Paragraph 6 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles deals with controls. Since it contains only four sentences, I should like to read it into the record, lest we tend to forget its simple meaning:

"All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried

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out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification." (ENDC/5, pages 2 and 3)

What difference has thus far arisen in the application of these agreed principles?

Much has been said about what is called "control over armaments". Here the basic question is simply one of what kind of disarmament measure we are talking about. Let us approach the problem of applying the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles on a case-by-case basis rather than in abstract terms.

If the obligation relates solely to the reduction of armaments, the verification measures need relate only to the reduction process. An example of this kind of measure is the transfer of agreed or specified quantities of weapon-grade U-235 to non-weapon purposes.

If the measure is one in which the parties agree to halt or limit production, the international disarmament organization must have access to the relevant production facilities and activities wherever located. An example is the proposed cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes.

If the obligation is one not to exceed agreed levels or not to engage in clandestine production activities, then these are the things to be verified. In such a case the extent of the inspection during any step of the stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty of possible violations. We have suggested a method of progressive zonal inspections as one possible way of accomplishing this purpose.

On the basis of these various considerations, the United States delegation has reached the conclusion that the most expeditious way of resolving our differences on verification would be to seek agreement on certain measures of disarmament, and to examine verification requirements quite specifically in relation to such measures. We are already in agreement as to the broad principles that would apply. The question is what measures they are to be applied to.

Let us then turn promptly to some of the major measures suggested in the first stage of the United States and Soviet drafts respectively.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Now our Bulgarian colleague, Mr. Tarabanov, made what could be called a somewhat bold comment in our meeting last Wednesday, when the United States delegation submitted for consideration the most comprehensive programme for disarmament that has so far been put before the Conference. His comment was that -

"... during the first stage, for example, the United States programme and proposals do not provide for any disarmament measures at all, or only provide for measures which do nothing to reduce the military potential of the great Powers or of other States." (ENDC/PV.23, page 21)

If my Bulgarian colleague does not consider that a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction of armaments, including the United States B-52 aircraft, the United States Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads, tanks, submarines and the ten categories of armaments set forth in stage I of the United States plan, would contribute most substantially to the reduction of military potential, then we do indeed have very different ideas to what constitutes disarmament. However, I do not intend to start a debate on this detailed point. I do not believe that our work would be advanced if we kept accusing one another of not wanting disarmament or of not providing for it in our respective proposals. Rather, I believe that we must concentrate on the substance of the proposals before us and attempt to reconcile the different approaches underlying them, so as to develop a common method of reaching our goal of general and complete disarmament, to which all of us have subscribed and which we must achieve.

This is why I would like to start this morning on a comparative analysis of the treaty outline for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30) which I submitted on behalf of the United States at our meeting last Wednesday, and the proposal (ENDC/2) which has been presented by the representative of the Soviet Union. Both these documents have been distributed by the Secretariat and are before the Conference.

I would like to begin my analysis by taking up the problems presented by these two documents with regard to the manner in which they deal with the problem of armaments. I would like to do so in the light of paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, dated 20 September 1961, which provides that:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The United States proposal for the reduction of armaments during stage I begins on page 4 of document ENDC/30. It provides for a 30 per cent across-the-board cut of all armaments that it seems reasonable to supervise in this stage -- that is, all nuclear delivery vehicles and all conventional armaments.

As I have previously indicated, this cut is to be taken in three yearly steps of 10 per cent each. It is to be applied to the armaments of the United States and those of the Soviet Union, and to the armaments of such of the parties to the treaty as might be agreed upon. This cut should be applied not only to each category of armaments but, with minor exceptions with which I shall deal later in a separate statement on production, to each type of armament within the various categories.

An illustrative list of the categories of armaments to be dealt with in stage I is set forth on pages 4 and 5 of the United States treaty outline. The first of these categories is:

"(1) Armed combat aircraft having any empty weight of 40,000 kilogrammes or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater."

(ENDC/30, page 4)

This is the first category of armaments. As a part of its illustrative list, the United States has set forth nine other categories of armaments on page 5 of its treaty outline. They are as follows:

"(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 kilogrammes and 40,000 kilogrammes and those missiles not included in category (1) having a range between 300 kilometres and 5,000 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads ...

"(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilogrammes ...

"(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 kilometres and 300 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads ...

"(5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads ...

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"(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads ...

"(7) Tanks ...

"(8) Armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers ...

"(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater ...

"(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines ..." (ENDC/30, page 5)

The proposed 30 per cent cut would be applicable to all of these categories and, as I have indicated, to each type of armament within each category.

The Soviet Union proposes a quite different approach to the reduction armaments. In articles 5 through 8 of its draft treaty, which are to be found on pages 5 through 7 of document ENDC/2, the Soviet Union proposes the destruction during stage I of "all rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons"; "all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons"; "all surface warships, capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines of any class or type"; and "all artillery systems, capable of serving as means of delivery for nuclear weapons".

Its provision with respect to the reduction of conventional armaments is not quite as clear. Paragraph 3 of article 2, found on page 10 of the Soviet draft, provides merely that:

"All released conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions of the disbanded units shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and subsidiary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Conventional armaments and equipment intended for reserve forces shall also be destroyed".

What are the differences? These are of two major types. First, the United States proposes a 30 per cent reduction in all categories of armaments during the first stage. The Soviet Union proposes the complete elimination of those armaments capable of delivery of nuclear weapons during stage I, while proposing only unspecified cuts --- I repeat, unspecified cuts --- in other major conventional armaments.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Secondly, the United States draft proposes a reduction not only by category but, with the limited exception which I will discuss in a few days in a statement on production, by types of all armaments within the category. With respect to conventional armaments, the proposal of the Soviet Union does not deal with the problem of reduction by specified types within a category as opposed to the reduction by categories. In the conventional field the Soviet draft would apparently leave the parties in the conventional field free to reduce only the less efficient of its armaments within the various categories, and the Soviet draft would then permit continued build-up of total destructive capability within the limits of continued production permitted. I propose to deal with this second difference in somewhat more detail in a subsequent statement.

In developing its position the United States has sought to take into account the views expressed by various participants in past disarmament negotiations including, indeed, the views expressed by the Soviet Union itself. The United States has also sought to take into account the lessons which have been learned by experience in these negotiations. One lesson is that whenever there is an attempt to treaty varying categories of disarmament differently, the negotiations can be successful only if the impact of the differing reductions in the various categories falls equally on both sides. This is the reason for paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which I quoted earlier in my speech. Neither party will proceed with a measure which would permit the other State or groups of States to gain military advantage during the course of it. It is for that reason that negotiations which treat the various categories of armaments differently have usually bogged down in somewhat unprofitable wrangling in defining the categories because of concern on the part of a State affected the most by a cut in a particular category.

The United States proposal is a realistic attempt to cut through this mass of detail and to avoid this unprofitable wrangling. It is an attempt to do so based on the belief of the United States that a major emphasis should be placed during those negotiations on ensuring significant progress at an early stage in a disarmament programme in order to reduce the dangers posed by an escalating arms race.

An Across-the-board cut of armaments of the type proposed by the United States avoids the difficulties presented by the problem of categories. It is a way which will make it possible to achieve significant progress at an early stage in a disarmament programme in reducing the dangers posed by an escalating arms race.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Each nation now understands its own armament structure, and each nation has a fairly good understanding of the armaments structure of its neighbours.

To a very large degree these armament structures reflect the particular strategic situation in which each of the nations finds itself. For example, a nation which has extensive oceans intervening between itself and its principal allies will, not surprisingly, place a fairly high degree of emphasis upon naval power. Contrarily, a nation which controls an extremely large land mass with relatively long land borders will -- and again this is not surprising -- emphasize such armaments as tanks, armoured cars and artillery. An attempt to change the relative emphasis within these categories of armaments in the early stages of a disarmament programme will present each of these nations -- one primarily a naval Power, the other primarily a land Power -- with a difficult problem of reassessing its total strategic situation. This will take a great deal of time. Early progress may be possible, however, if we attempt to work out measures together proportionately. This will keep the relative military situation of the parties as near as possible to what it was at the beginning of the disarmament process. We must be very realistic about this problem.

The Soviet Union's proposal, which involves the elimination of all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in the first stage while making only a relatively small decrease in conventional armaments, would not leave unchanged the relative military position of the parties during the disarmament process. It would not, I submit, comply with paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which we have all agreed should guide these negotiations, that the disarmament process should take place by a series of balanced measures so that at no stage during the process would any State or group of States gain a relative military advantage.

I fully understand the desire of all of us to deal with the danger posed by nuclear weapons delivery vehicles; it is these nuclear weapons delivery vehicles which, more than any others, have created a new condition in the world so that general war could place our civilization, as we now know it, in serious jeopardy. It is these armaments which have radically altered all concepts of national power, and altered them to a degree and in ways which we are only beginning to appreciate and understand. It is these nuclear weapons delivery vehicles which, more than any other devices, make necessary our question for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

At the same time, it must be recognized that progress in the areas of reducing nuclear delivery vehicles must have an appropriate relationship -- I repeat, an appropriate relationship -- to progress in reducing the armaments which make up the other elements of military power, if disarmament is to proceed in a balanced manner that will protect the security of all nations. Let me put it very clearly: The Soviet block probably has a preponderance of conventional military power which could be brought to bear in Europe at the present time. I think most military writers and strategists would be in agreement on that point. This preponderance is in large part offset by a relatively greater preponderance in the nuclear field held by the United States and its allies. I think most military writers and strategists would be in relative agreement on that point. I do not ask the representative of the Soviet Union to confirm this point. I know that we can find various elements of nuclear power in which one side or the other may claim to be ahead -- if this term "to be ahead" retains any real meaning in the present-day context -- but in general and overall terms a conventional superiority on the part of the Soviet Union is balanced by relative nuclear superiority possessed by others. I repeat, there may be arguments as to detail on this point, but I think what I have said is relatively true. In these circumstances I suggest that, while we are attempting to attain a balance, it may be less than realistic to propose that the means of delivering nuclear weapons be completely eliminated in stage I while only the first steps are being taken during that stage to reduce the elements of conventional power.

I would also submit that, although the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in a single stage of fifteen months has the appearance of great simplicity, this appearance of simplicity is quite superficial; it just is not realistic. We all know that nuclear delivery vehicles cannot be eliminated all at once. Within whatever period the elimination of these vehicles takes place and whatever relationship it must have to the reduction and elimination of other armaments, we will be faced at all stages with the necessity of developing the so-called balanced steps agreed to in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September last. So I think that by making its proposal the Soviet Union has undertaken the burden of proving to the members of this Conference how the complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles would be implemented consistently with this requirement of balanced reduction.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

In this connexion, I think it should be pointed out that the position of the Soviet Union on the complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I is quite incompatible with its position on verification. For as I read the Soviet proposal, it does not call for full development of the verification process until the completion of stage III. Article 38 of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2, page 24) provides that the international disarmament organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the treaty for the purpose of preventing the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments which have been abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament. Presumably this does not take place until the end of stage III. As I read the Soviet proposal, it provides that prior to the end of stage III the international disarmament organization merely has the right to inspect the process of dismantling of armaments and disbanding of forces; the organization would have no right -- I repeat, no right -- to determine whether agreed levels were being exceeded or clandestine activities being carried on -- Mr. Zorin has told us that such a right would constitute espionage.

I should be very happy if the representative of the Soviet Union would correct me if I am wrong in my interpretation of the Soviet proposal, but after very careful study this is the way I interpret that proposal -- and I believe I am supported in this by Mr. Zorin's remarks. Yet the Soviet Union is now proposing the complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles -- a measure involving probably the most sensitive aspects of military security and thus requiring the most effect verification --, and it is proposing that this elimination should take place completely during stage I, a stage of disarmament in which, under the Soviet approach, there is to be a minimum amount of verification.

It is for these reasons that I believe that an across-the-board cut in all armaments is fairer and more apt to be productive of a prompt arrival at an agreement. It is my plan to discuss in a series of statements the details of the United States proposal and to compare these with the Soviet proposal. This is the end of my statement on this particular matter this morning. I wanted to make this comparison today merely because I believe that we must fulfil paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles in order to arrive at general and complete disarmament. As I have said, it is my purpose to make these detailed analyses from time to time in order that we may proceed to our actual work of agreeing upon general and complete disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has been carefully studying article 2 of the Soviet Union draft disarmament treaty; and we have also read over the statement about control which was made by the representative of the Soviet Union at our twenty-first meeting. We should now like to set forth some observations on the Soviet Union draft of this article, and Mr. Zorin's explanation of its purpose and meaning.

In general we have no objection to what is set down in the article. There are, however, some exceptions which I will now mention.

We note that in paragraph 3 of this article, it is stated:

"The international disarmament organization shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated." (ENDC/2, page 3)

Looking at part V of the Soviet Union draft treaty, which deals in detail with the international disarmament organization, we find that article 45 calls for a preparatory commission to be set up:

"... with the task of taking practical steps to establish the international disarmament organization" (ibid., page 28)

This is to be done "immediately after the signing of the ... treaty ..." (ibid.)

I wonder whether this means after the signing, or after the ratification. But in any case I take it that the principle is established that the international disarmament organization will be organized beforehand and ready to commence its functions immediately when disarmament measures begin to be put into effect.

I must say that in paragraph 4 we do not care for the expression "... all three existing groups of States". Some time in the first century B.C. Julius Caesar wrote that all Gaul was divided into three parts. I do not know that anyone contradicted him. But today we can hardly accept such a dogmatic statement applied to the world. One could describe the members of the Warsaw Pact as a group and the members of NATO as a group, but I do not think that all the other States of the world can in any sense be described as a group. The Canadian delegation would like to see the principle embodied in paragraph 4 expressed as follows: "in such a way as to assure the equitable representation on it of all parties to the treaty".

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I should also like to refer to paragraph 2, which says:

"Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure." (ENDC/2, page 3)

I mention this because we think it indicates that for each measure of disarmament we are considering, we should concurrently discuss the control -- or, to use the expression in English which we prefer, the verification -- measures required to ensure that the disarmament obligations embodied in that measure were being complied with. This is a point that the representative of the United States made in his statement. As a number of other speakers have pointed out, we shall get a better idea of each other's meanings, intentions and preoccupations if we discuss concrete measures of disarmament and their associated concrete measures of verification when if we go on talking of control in the abstract.

I said at the beginning that the Canadian delegation is in agreement with the provisions of article 2 of the Soviet Union draft, with the exceptions I have cited. I do not mean by this that we think that this article should necessarily appear in its present, or even in a slightly amended, form in the eventual draft treaty. We understand, and we expect, that the Co-Chairmen will continue to work together to reach an agreed form for the matter contained in articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Soviet Union draft treaty and the corresponding parts of the United States draft treaty.

In the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union at our twenty-first meeting there are several points which seem to me to call for some comment.

I would first call the attention of the Committee to what Mr. Zorin said at that meeting:

"We are not prepared to take anyone at their word, particularly States which have organized closed military alignments pursuing a policy of proliferating armaments and establishing their military bases along the frontiers of the Soviet Union. We ourselves do not ask that we should be taken at our word."

(ENDC/PV.21, page 27)

This is a fair statement of an important principle. We shall have occasion to refer to it again in later discussions.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In the next paragraph on the same page Mr. Zorin said:

"As Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government has already explained on more than one occasion, the Soviet Union is prepared to accept any proposal on control over disarmament that the Western Powers may put forward, if they will accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament".

(ibid.)

Well, we have heard this statement a number of times, but we are still not sure exactly what it means. In fact, we think that there are three possible interpretations of it, at least. They might be as follows: first, the West accepts a given measure of disarmament within the Soviet plan, and they accept whatever control provisions we attach to that measure -- that is, measure and control balance off; secondly, the West accepts the entire Soviet plan and they accept any control measures we propose for the disarmament programme; and thirdly, the West not only accepts the whole Soviet plan, but must also wait until it -- or something very like it -- is implemented down to the third stage, and then they will be prepared to accept whatever control provisions we choose.

Now which of these three interpretations is the right one? Perhaps none of them correctly explains what Mr. Khrushchev had in mind. We should be very interested to have some elucidation of this point from Mr. Zorin at an appropriate time.

Later in that same statement we find Mr. Zorin saying:

"The Soviet Government, in considering the functions, powers and procedures of work of the International Disarmament Organization, came to the conclusion that there is no need to introduce the principle of unanimity or the "veto" in this Organization and that decisions can be taken by a majority of votes."

(ENDC/PV.21, page 29)

The Canadian delegation is very pleased to note this conclusion of the Soviet delegation, and we think it will facilitate agreement on the organization and functioning of the international disarmament organization when we come to consider it in detail.

A further conclusion of the Soviet Government is stated in the following terms:

"... The volume of control should be in strict conformity with the volume and nature of the disarmament measures being carried out at that particular stage. What are the advantages of such an approach to the settlement of the control question? In the first place, this approach ensures strict and reliable

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

verification of the compliance by all States with each of the agreed disarmament measures and, in the second place, it will in no way prejudice the national security interests of States. It is disarmament measures that are controlled and verified, and not the armed forces and armaments remaining at the disposal of States at a particular stage." (ibid.)

I think that this statement is a little obscure. I take it to mean "by controlled and checked measures of disarmament and not by control of armed forces still available to the States at a given stage". That would, I think, correspond to the frequently-cited position of the Soviet Union in this matter. The argument in favour of the principle of controlling only the armaments destroyed or converted and the personnel disbanded, as given above, sets out in more detail and more clearly than we have heard before the frequently reiterated position of the Soviet Union, which might briefly be described as control only over disarmament. With all respect, we do not think that this position and the argument with which Mr. Zorin has explained it is in harmony with the statement he made earlier in his remarks which I will quote again:

"We are not prepared to take anyone at their word ... We ourselves do not ask that we should be taken at our word." (ENDC/PV.21, page 27)

Mr. Zorin went on to state:

"For even at present one side has no exact information on the size of the armaments and armed forces of the other side." (ibid., page 30)

That is so, although I must point out that much more is made public concerning the numbers of armed personnel and the armaments of Western nations than is the case with regard to those of the Soviet Union and its allies. Therefore, the approximation which the Soviet Union can make of Western forces and armaments is necessarily a good deal more exact than the one which the West can make of the Soviet Union's. However, this condition is recognized, I think, in the proposals which the United States has made in its draft basic treaty; and although, as we understand it, there are some risk and uncertainty involved, they can be accepted because the actual disarmament takes place in relatively small increments so that there is no serious danger of upsetting the balance of forces even if the declared amount of armaments on which the reduction is to be based should not be correct. But if there were to be total abolition of certain kinds of armaments in a single step, the danger of merely taking the word of the other side would be very considerable.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Let us consider a hypothetical case, to put the proposition in simple terms. Let us consider that State "A" and State "B", under the disarmament treaty, are obliged to destroy all their tanks in one step. State "A" has 2,000 tanks and so declares to the international disarmament organization. State "B" has 3,000 tanks but declares only 2,000. Pursuant to the principle of verifying the destruction of armaments, the inspectors of the international disarmament organization supervise the destruction of 2,000 tanks of each side. So at the end of this process State "B" has 1,000 tanks concealed somewhere which could give it considerable military advantage from that time forward. I have used tanks in my illustration, but members of the Committee will appreciate the applicability of the point illustrated to other more important armaments -- for example, to intercontinental ballistic missiles.

This is why, in the view of the Canadian delegation, in whatever verification measures we eventually adopt there must be fully adequate assurance not only that the armaments which it is agreed to destroy have actually been destroyed but that no State would be able, by false initial declaration, to gain a military advantage at any stage of disarmament. And when I say "false initial declaration", may I again refer to the principle Mr. Zorin enunciated? "We are not prepared to take anyone at their word ... We ourselves do not ask that we should be taken at our word."

The first few sentences on page 31 of the verbatim record for 16 April (ENDC/PV.21) state the Soviet objection to measures of control which they consider would allow a potential aggressor to obtain vital intelligence, putting their national security in jeopardy before substantial disarmament had been effected. The United States and its allies recognize this as a legitimate concern on the part of the Soviet Union. In consequence, the United States, in its latest proposals, which were explained by Mr. Dean at our twenty-third meeting and further explained today, has suggested methods of verification of compliance with obligations which are intended to give adequate assurance to all concerned -- "adequate" assurance, not "full" assurance -- that no evasion is taking place, while at the same time they do not lay any party open to unjustifiable exposure of its military dispositions during the first stage of disarmament.

In closing, I should like to emphasize once more that, although I have thought it necessary to express these views of the Canadian delegation in relation to some of the remarks on control made by the Soviet representative, as recorded in the

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

verbatim record of our twenty-first meeting, this Committee should work out the necessary minimum measures of verification of disarmament at the same time as we work out the measures of disarmament. The two things should go concurrently; in that way we shall be in less danger of wasting our time and creating misunderstandings than if we go on discussing control in the abstract.

Mr. ZCWIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): This morning we have heard a fairly detailed statement by the representative of the United States, who dealt in part with questions of control, and also described some of the provisions of the United States disarmament plan, the final version of which was submitted to our Committee in the form of a document on 18 April (ENDC/30 and Corr.1). Mr. Dean described certain provisions of this plan, in particular those relating to the first stage of disarmament, and compared them with the corresponding provisions of the Soviet plan -- the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament which has been before us for over a month (ENDC/2).

Of course, I shall revert to what has been said this morning by the United States representative, Mr. Dean, and we shall examine in greater detail certain specific considerations which have been expressed this morning. However, it seems to us that, since the United States proposal has been submitted to the Committee, we should try to make at least an elementary analysis of this proposal, especially in the light of the general tasks confronting our Committee and of the main task on which we are working, the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Therefore, without going specifically into the considerations which have been expressed by Mr. Dean, I intend today to deal with this document which has been submitted by the United States for consideration by the Committee.

At the meeting on 18 April the United States delegation submitted a document entitled "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World". We have listened very carefully to Mr. Dean's statement explaining the document which he submitted. Naturally, the Soviet delegation will continue to study the disarmament plan set forth by the United States in this document, and as we move forward in discussing and harmonizing the provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we shall make detailed comments on the relevant parts of the United States document. Now, however, we should like to express some general preliminary considerations which suggest themselves after a first examination of the United States document, as well as in connexion with the clarifications which have been given in the Committee by Mr. Dean.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

First of all, I should like to note that we assess as a positive element the fact that the United States delegation deemed it possible, though after some delay, to put forward a document which more or less fully outlines the position of the **United States Government on disarmament questions.** This should undoubtedly facilitate the task of the Committee in following the agreed procedure of work, according to which the draft treaty should be discussed article by article, section by section, and efforts should be made to reach agreement on these articles and sections. The agreed procedure of work has already produced positive results, and we must steadfastly adhere to it.

At the same time it can only be regretted that the United States delegation has submitted not a draft treaty, not a document setting forth in treaty language the obligations of States in regard to general and complete disarmament, but only an outline of basic provisions. We believe that the stage has long since been passed when we could confine ourselves to submitting general provisions or outlines of provisions. At the present time the General Assembly has put before the Committee a clear and precise task, namely to work out an agreement on general and complete disarmament. And the more closely the documents submitted correspond to the nature of this task, the greater are the possibilities of successfully coping with it. From this point of view the United States document, unfortunately does not fully meet this requirement.

The document on general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States delegation, as was in fact explained by Mr. Dean, is based on the United States programme on disarmament question (ENDC/6) which was put forward by President Kennedy at the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 25 September 1961. Its basic difference from this programme is the fact that to some extent it spells the programme out and presents more fully and in greater detail the views of the United States on how, in its opinion, a disarmament programme should be constructed. Quite naturally, we and other members of the Committee are interested, above all, in the extent to which the new United States document has eliminated the shortcomings of the United States proposal on disarmament questions of 25 September 1961.

As the Soviet Government has already pointed out, the basic shortcomings of the United States programme on disarmament questions of 25 September 1961 were, first, that this programme did not provide for the conclusion of a single treaty on general and complete disarmament with precise and clear obligations to be assumed by States

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

for the implementation of general and complete disarmament. In this programme, for example, there were no provisions for the prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It did not say anything clearly about the complete liquidation of the military machines of States. In fact this programme aimed at concluding a whole series of separate agreements on partial measures, which of course provided no guarantee that general and complete disarmament would be carried out.

The other important shortcoming of the United States programme was that it was not in keeping with one of the basic agreed principles (ENDC/5): the principle that all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced in such a way that at no stage of the implementation of general and complete disarmament could any State or group of States gain military advantage, and that security would be ensured equally for all. This was shown, in particular, by the fact that in providing in the first stage for a reduction of certain categories of means of delivery of nuclear weapons and in the first place long range rockets, the United States passed over in complete silence the question of the dismantling of foreign military bases in alien territories. Behind this was the obvious intention to weaken the Soviet Union in respect of a number of types of weapons essential for its defence, and at the same time to leave intact the widespread network of foreign military bases placed by the United States in the vicinity of the Soviet frontiers.

Finally, a no less important shortcoming of the United States programme submitted by President Kennedy was that the control measures proposed in it were in sharp contrast with disarmament measures. In fact, the United States programme led to the result that, instead of the implementation of general and complete disarmament under strict international control, the matter was reduced to the establishment of control over armaments. In proposing very limited disarmament measures for the first stage, namely the reduction of the armed forces of the USSR and the United States to 2.1 million and some reduction of the means of delivery, the United States at the same time put forward a demand for the establishment of a comprehensive control which in reality would result in a legalized system of international espionage.

The United States programme of 25 September 1961 contained other serious shortcomings, but some of them were, so to speak, only in embryo form. As is evident from the document submitted on 18 April, these shortcomings are now expressed more fully and clearly. We shall deal with them later.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

What is the situation in regard to the very important questions I have just referred to in the new United States document? In the first place, does the United States proposal set forth in this document ensure the achievement of general and complete disarmament? In this connexion I shall deal first of all with nuclear weapons.

During the work of the Committee it has been repeatedly stressed that the main task confronting States at the present time is to carry out urgent measures which would save the peoples from the danger of a nuclear war and would lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. How can this aim be achieved? There are two possible ways. One of them is to adopt measures for the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons at the very beginning of general and complete disarmament. We know, however, that the Western Powers see difficulties in implementing such measures and, despite our repeated proposals in the past, stubbornly insist that measures for the prohibition, elimination and abolition of nuclear weapons should be postponed to a later stage of disarmament. As is well known, in our proposals which are before the Committee, we have taken these views of the Western Powers into account.

There is another way, namely to take from the very beginning of the implementation of the disarmament programme such steps as would lead to the neutralization of nuclear weapons and thus make their use practically impossible. This can be achieved through elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. It is appropriate to recall that this way was proposed some time ago by France. We considered it reasonable and included it in our disarmament plan.

It goes without saying that the task of averting the danger of a nuclear war through the neutralization of nuclear weapons can only be achieved if the destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons are completely eliminated and destroyed. The draft treaty which we have submitted provides for the complete elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons within a short period -- to be more precise, within the first eighteen months. The implementation of the provisions of our draft treaty would have the result that in eighteen months' time there would no longer loom over the peoples the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war, and the threat of one State being attacked by another with the use of nuclear weapons would practically disappear.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

But how is this question dealt with in the United States document? If we followed the United States disarmament plan, the threat of a nuclear war breaking out would loom over the peoples for an indefinitely long time. Let us ask ourselves the question whether the removal of the danger of a nuclear war would be ensured by the United States proposal to reduce the means of delivering nuclear weapons by 30% in the first stage. I believe that there cannot be two opinions in this regard. Such a reduction would in no way remove the danger of a nuclear conflict. You see, the States would still have at their disposal 70% of the means of delivering nuclear weapons which they have at the present time. And that would be the situation after three years. During the first year they would have at their disposal 90% of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons themselves would be retained by States without any reduction, and the United States document nowhere provides even for the prohibition of their use.

Would the danger of a nuclear war breaking out disappear, if we followed the United States plan also in the second stage of disarmament? No, it would not disappear. States would still retain the means of delivering nuclear weapons, quite sufficient for dealing a powerful nuclear blow at some other State.

The threat of a nuclear attack would evidently remain also in the course of the whole third stage of disarmament, that is, practically to the end of the implementation of the programme, which the United States document calls nevertheless a programme of general and complete disarmament.

As in the United States programme of 25 September 1961, in the new United States document submitted to the Committee there is no straightforward and clear indication of the point in the implementation of general and complete disarmament at which the complete elimination of nuclear weapons should take place. It is appropriate to recall that the United States programme on disarmament questions submitted at the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed some doubt about the possibility of the controlled reduction and elimination of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This United States programme provided in the first stage for the establishment of an experts commission -

"for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles" (ENEC/6, page 4).

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

We find a similar provision in section C, paragraph 6, of the new United States document (ENDC/30, page 10), in the section dealing with questions relating to nuclear weapons. This section also provides for some sort of examination of the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons.

What would this provision look like in practice? In this connexion I recall the statement made by Mr. Dean at the meeting of the Committee on 29 March. He said that under the United States plan stocks of nuclear weapons -

"would be further reduced by agreed amounts or to agreed levels, depending upon the findings of the nuclear experts commission. Until the nuclear experts devised means for safely controlling the reduction and elimination of nuclear stockpiles no nation would, consistent with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, permit the reduction of its own stockpiles to lower levels - to say nothing of the complete elimination of the nuclear weapons in its stockpiles." (ENDC/PV.11, pp.12-13).

In the extract which I have quoted, Mr. Dean referred to the Agreed Principles. However, I should like to remind you that the Agreed Principles clearly include the obligation to eliminate all - and I emphasize "all" - stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Thus Mr. Dean clearly sins against the truth by trying to cover up with reference to the Agreed Principles the attempts of the United States to provide a loophole for the retention of nuclear weapons in the armaments of States.

The United States delegation may say, of course, that in paragraph I of Section "C", which deals with nuclear weapons in connexion with the third stage of disarmament (ENDC/30, page 29) they are talking about the elimination of all stocks of nuclear weapons. However, in this paragraph there is an important reservation, namely: that these measures will be undertaken "in the light of the steps taken in Stages I and II." If we translate this into simpler language, it means that the United States delegation makes the complete elimination of nuclear weapons depend on the results of the work of the experts who, according to its proposal, are to be convened in the first stage of disarmament. It seems to me that experience has shown convincingly enough that, if there is no desire to reach agreement, experts will never reach an agreed decision on the elimination of nuclear weapons, and these seemingly unimportant reservations in the United States document will become an insurmountable obstacle to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In connexion with nuclear weapons, it is noteworthy that the formula in the United States document to the effect that the armed forces of the United Nations, and there are reasons to believe that the United States has in mind very large armed forces, will be equipped with agreed types of armaments. The general approach of the United States to the elimination of nuclear weapons compels one to think that the United States apparently has in mind that the so-called international armed forces of the United Nations should be equipped with nuclear weapons.

In judging any proposal by whether it would lead to general and complete disarmament, it is impossible to disregard the question: does it provide for the conclusion of a single treaty on general and complete disarmament including definite obligations of States? We have already had sufficient discussion on this score, and it seems to me that as a result of the exchange of views we have come to the conclusion that a single treaty on general and complete disarmament should be prepared. Moreover, in the draft preamble which we recently accepted, it is clearly provided that the task of the present negotiations is to prepare a single treaty on general and complete disarmament, covering all the obligations of States in this field.

The document submitted by the United States seems superficially to indicate that the preparation of a single treaty is intended. At the same time, however, the provisions of the United States document give serious grounds for believing that we are faced again with attempts to dismember the disarmament programme, to erect partitions between the stages, partitions which disrupt the unity of the process of general and complete disarmament. A first reading of the United States document leads to the thought that matters might not go beyond the first stage.

Indeed, the United States document contains a number of points, the meaning of which is to give any permanent member of the control council or the Security Council the right unilaterally to stop the process of disarmament under the pretext that, in its opinion, the requisite conditions have not been brought about for transition to the implementation of the next stage of disarmament. In other words, the United States establishes, so to speak, a veto over the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and indeed in such a way as would enable a State not wishing to carry out general and complete disarmament to evade the responsibility for such a step. Can one consider a document containing such a provision to be a document creating favourable conditions for the implementation of general and complete disarmament?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In this connexion it is also noteworthy that the United States does not provide for specific time-limits either for the implementation of the third stage of disarmament or for the whole disarmament programme. Even with regard to the two first stages, for which the United States appears to have provided for specific time-limits, there are reservations which would make it possible to delay and postpone their implementation.

What I have said before makes one doubt whether the United States proposals, the United States disarmament plan, can in fact lead to general and complete disarmament. Thus we see the discrepancy between the United States document and the Agreed Principles of disarmament, which set a clear task, namely that of achieving general and complete disarmament.

As I pointed out at the beginning of my statement, the United States programme on disarmament questions submitted to the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations is at variance with the agreed principle that at no stage of disarmament should any State or group of States gain military advantage and that all parties to the agreement should be in an equal position as regards the ensuring of their security. Unfortunately, it must be pointed out that the new United States document also contains the same shortcomings. It does not guarantee an equal position for all States as regards the ensuring of their security. This conclusion is based on the fact that the United States, as in the case of its previous proposal, evades the question of the elimination of foreign military bases.

Let us turn to the first stage of disarmament about which Mr. Dean spoke today, as it is set out in the new United States document. While providing for a reduction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, this stage does not contain any provision for the elimination of foreign military bases. The United States document mentions bases only in the second stage, provision being made for the dismantling not of all such bases but only of "agreed military bases", without any reference to the fact that what should be concerned are not military bases in general but foreign military bases in the territories of other States. Let us consider what would be the practical consequence of the implementation of the first stage of the United States disarmament programme.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The Soviet Union has no bases in the territories of other States. It builds its defences primarily on the most up-to-date means of delivering nuclear weapons. It is precisely such means of delivering nuclear weapons that the United States proposes to reduce. The result of this would be, of course, the weakening of the defence capability of the Soviet Union. But what would happen at the same time to the United States military bases which are located in the territories of other States around the Soviet Union? Nothing at all. The bases would remain intact; and moreover there would be at these bases, as before, United States nuclear weapons aimed against the Soviet Union. It is fact that, in speaking about the need to adopt measures to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, the United States limits itself to a provision not to transfer control over any nuclear weapons to other States, and does not say a word about nuclear weapons having to be withdrawn from foreign territories. How then can one assert that the United States plan is a balanced one which ensured an equal position for all States?

As in the United States programme on disarmament questions of 25 September 1961, so in the new United States document the main emphasis is laid on the establishment of comprehensive control from the very beginning of the disarmament process. The United States document describes in minute detail the items which the United States would like to place under control the day after the disarmament treaty comes into force. With the first steps in disarmament, at the very beginning of the first stage, everything is placed under control - the means of delivering nuclear weapons, rocket launching pads, airfields, ports. All industrial plants engaged in the production of military equipment and armaments are to be internationally supervised. Inspectors of the international control organization are to be entitled to search every corner of any country under the pretext of discovering "clandestine" activities. Aerial inspection and photography are to be introduced.

I shall not take up the time of the members of the Committee by enumerating all these measures. Members can easily see them for themselves in the United States document which we received on 18 April (ENDC/30). One thing is beyond doubt: that the United States demands in fact that States should reveal their whole defence system from the first day of the implementation of the disarmament programme. What is such control - if I may call it that - needed for? Who needs it? Would it strengthen confidence, as Mr. Dean asserted, and increase mutual security?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

It seems to me that the answers to these questions are perfectly clear. In the situation in which the United States disarmament programme, in all its three stages, would not in fact remove the threat of a nuclear attack, the establishment of comprehensive control would by no means strengthen confidence, nor would it increase mutual security. It could only have the opposite result, namely, create a deadly danger to peace-loving States. From such control, which essentially is not control over disarmament but control over armaments, the only ones who would gain would be those who are fostering aggressive plans, who are interested in developing intelligence activities in order to obtain information about the vital centres and defence system of a country which they regard as a potential enemy.

Mr. Dean's remark concerning so-called zonal or sampling inspection-- which incidentally was given by the United States delegation by way of illustration -- does not introduce anything new in this respect. It is difficult for us to understand how Mr. Dean can assert that in matters of control the United States plan is limited to the necessary minimum and that the control measures proposed by United States strictly correspond to disarmament measures. While agreeing to very limited and one-sided disarmament which would give the Western Powers advantage over the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States, the United States demands unlimited control, control which would penetrate to all corners of a country. All this compels us to draw the conclusion that the United States continued to adhere to its old positions aimed at substituting control without real disarmament for disarmament under control.

As members of the Committee will recall, when the draft preamble to the treaty was being drafted, we could not agree with the United States delegation on two points -- that disarmament should be carried out "in a peaceful world"; and that under disarmament, adjustment to change in the world should take place "in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter". Even at that time we had misgivings about what the United States implied in these points. Now that the United States has explained in its document of 18 April what it means by peace in a disarmed world and the procedure of adjustment to change, we see that our misgivings were more than justified.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In the document of 18 April the United States puts forward a whole political programme which, incidentally, judging by what we have heard, is a demand, and only on condition of its acceptance will the United States agree to general and complete disarmament. To avoid accusations that I am trying to see in the United States proposals something they do not contain, I shall refer to an assessment made in the United States Press. On the very next day after the United States proposals had been submitted, the New York World Telegram stated on the subject of these proposals that the United States had announced the price which the world should pay if it wants general and complete disarmament. And what is the price which the United States demands of the world, of all countries? The New York World Telegram says that it is the establishment of international institutions which would encourage countries to give up the greater part of their national sovereignty: the undoubted and unconditional recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; the acceptance of supra-national inspection and verification; willingness to make national security dependent on an international peace force under a greatly changed and strengthened United Nations.

This, in short, is the substance of the United States political demands; and the writer of the article, far from exaggerating, on the contrary, failed to mention a good many things. The United States is, in fact, proposing no less than the establishment of some supra-State, supra-national authority possessing international armed forces and entitled to dictate its will to States and to take enforcement measures against them.

The Soviet Union is an ardent advocate of the peaceful settlement of disputes between States. We are against any attempts to settle disputes by force of arms. But the peaceful settlement of disputes means negotiation without encroaching upon the rights and interests of any particular party; it means mutual concessions and seeking mutually-acceptable settlements without encroaching upon the sovereign rights of any State. The United States proposal emphasizes something else: compulsory arbitration, the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the establishment of a special Peace Observation Corps and enforcement measures to ensure compliance with international agreements. No matter what fine words have been used, it would mean, in practice, an encroachment upon the sovereign rights of one State or another and an attempt to set up a supra-national international authority acting in favour of those who would be at the head of it.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The United States document speaks about strengthening the peaceful means of the United Nations for the settlement of disputes; but at the same time United Nations armed forces would be established and expanded. These would be so powerful that they would be able, according to the idea of the authors of the United States draft, to "deter or suppress any threat or use of arms" (ENDC/30, p.2). As one can clearly see from the document, the United States is actually trying to circumvent the United Nations and its Charter. For example, it is well known that Article 43 of the United Nations Charter provides for the conclusion of agreements with States, whereby they make available to the Security Council armed forces for the implementation of international obligations under the Charter. The United States proposes, in section H, paragraph 5b, of its document in respect of stage 1 of disarmament, to deal only with the "examination of the feasibility" of concluding such agreements. But the United States document speaks of the establishment of some other International force outside the provisions of Article 43 as an obligation, and, moreover, details this obligation by including in section H, paragraph 5c:

"... definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments" (ibid., p.18).

It would seem that this should be a basis for agreements under Article 43 of the Charter, but for some reason or other it is related to another section. In accordance with Article 43, it is proposed to "examine the feasibility of agreement", whereas paragraph 5c proposes the assumption of obligations and specifies all those elements which form, strictly speaking, the basis of agreements between the Security Council and any State making armed forces available to the Security Council. This is very symptomatic and, I must say frankly, causes justifiable alarm. The Soviet delegation will speak in greater detail on all these questions later, when we consider the relevant provisions of the treaty concerning measures for security and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Soviet delegation has stated its general preliminary views on the document submitted by the United States delegation at the meeting of 18 April. We have arrived at the views I have mentioned as a result of a preliminary analysis of the United States document. As I have already emphasised, the Soviet delegation will continue to study the United States proposals. We intend, in accordance with the agreed procedure of work, to express more detailed views on the United States proposals when we consider the relevant provisions of a treaty on general and complete

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

disarmament. Naturally, when making more detailed comments on individual specific provisions of the United States outline of a draft treaty, we shall examine them from the point of view of the general considerations which basically reflect the main trend of the United States position, as we understand it.

At one of our recent meetings it was asked how the future work of the Committee should be organized. I have already said at the very beginning of my statement that we should invariably follow the agreed procedure of work (ENDC/1 and Add.1) and continue to examine the treaty on general and complete disarmament paragraph by paragraph and section by section. In this respect the Soviet delegation fully shares the correct views expressed by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, at the 23rd meeting on 18 April, that we should continue the work that has been begun and complete our deliberations on the general introductory part of the treaty. We are already completing the discussion of article 1 defining the obligations of States in respect of general and complete disarmament measures. At present we are examining article 2 dealing with the obligations of States in respect of control over general and complete disarmament. I believe that, as a result of considering this article also, we shall reach agreement that steps should be taken to agree on a single text. Then we shall consider article 3 concerning the obligations of States in respect of measures to maintain international peace and security.

After that, we shall be able to proceed to consideration of the articles covering the first and subsequent stages of general and complete disarmament. Then we shall be able to consider in greater detail the basic disarmament and control measures as laid down for each stage in both the Soviet draft treaty and in the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty, which has now been submitted. The procedure of work which we have followed up to now has proved fruitful and enabled us to hold serious, business-like discussions in the Committee. Therefore we shall consistently follow this procedure, which has proved right.

We hope that in this work on the treaty we shall ascertain the positions we have in common, as well as the differences which we shall work further to overcome in order to ensure the speediest possible accomplishment of the main task confronting us - the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. LALL (India): We have today heard two rather far-reaching, wide-ranging statements by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. We have also heard, if I may say so, a more precise and very valuable statement by the Canadian representative. So far as we are concerned, we greatly appreciate the policy statements which have been made by the representatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union on certain points in the new United States plan, and the Soviet comments on the plan in general.

I should like to draw attention to certain aspects of the statements made today, with which we fully agree, regarding procedure at this stage. Mr. Dean said -- of course, he was talking about controls, but I want to take this a little further: "Let us approach the problem of applying the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles on a case-by-case basis rather than in abstract terms" (supra, page 6). Mr. Zorin said -- I could also quote earlier statements of his which carry the same sense, but I shall refer only to a sentence in today's statement --

"we intend... to express more detailed views on the United States proposals when we consider the relevant provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament" (supra, page 30).

The point which I am getting at is clear enough, I believe. It is this: Valuable as are these wide-ranging statements in enabling all members of the Committee to understand the approach of the United States and the Soviet Union to the overall question of general and complete disarmament, I believe the two delegations both realize that it is really more practical and wiser to approach this problem on a case-by-case basis rather than in abstract terms. This is an important point for our orderly procedure, and we hope that it will be possible for us to work on that basis.

We took note that Mr. Dean proposes to make a series of statements on the new United States plan. We will, of course, welcome these statements and listen to them with great attention. But, without I trust being misunderstood by our United States colleague, I would say that I presume he agreed that we should proceed in a manner which will enable us to make progress on a case-by-case, or item-by-item, or article-by-article basis rather than proceeding entirely in the abstract. I say this in the conviction that his view would not be very different from the one I am trying to express because of the nature of his own statement regarding the advantage of proceeding in a practical way rather than in general terms.

(Mr. Lall, India)

With these remarks in view, I would turn to the question of controls, that is to say, the first three pages of Mr. Dean's statement today. He has made this statement today pursuant to a brief intervention on 16 April when he said that he would study the remarks of his Soviet colleague and would be prepared to comment upon them in more detail at an early date (ENDC/PV.21, page 33).

Much time could be spent comparing the attitude towards control obligations or control provisions as expressed by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union. But after listening to what our Canadian colleague said, and after comparing the statements carefully, I feel it is not necessary for us to say much on this subject, because there is ground for thinking that the co-Chairmen can now take into account the statements made and give us a joint paper. Perhaps there will be a certain number of parentheses, but if they have no parentheses, so much the better. We do not need to follow every precedent. The precedent that the two co-Chairmen produce a joint paper is a good one. I will not say that the precedent that they put parentheses and double parentheses around certain words is a bad one; it is not in any sense an objectionable one; but if they can produce a paper straightaway without any parentheses, so much the better of course.

Why do I think that there is hope of their being able to do this? The first three pages of Mr. Dean's statement contained comments on Mr. Zorin's statement of 16 April (ENDC/PV.21, page 26). And to what conclusion did Mr. Dean come? He said that this conclusion was that the most expeditious way of resolving our differences on verification would be to seek agreement on certain disarmament measures and to examine verification requirements specifically in relation to such measures (supra, page 6). We entirely agree with that. Mr. Dean then went on to say, in this paragraph on conclusions, "We are already in agreement as to the broad principles that would apply". This is what Mr. Dean said today in summing up his comments on Mr. Zorin's statement of 16 April. I might be putting it too directly, but that is what it comes to. Therefore it seems to me that there is very good hope indeed of the co-Chairmen, on the basis of their own statements and the other statements which have been made, being able to produce a paper on obligations on controls.

Perhaps it might be desirable for me to mention two points which support this view. For example, Mr. Dean read into the record paragraph 6 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which deals with controls. The first sentence of paragraph 6 concludes with the words:

(Mr. Lall, India)

"such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations". (ENDC/5, page 2)

Does that not tally in substance with the following very important words which Mr. Burns quoted from Mr. Zorin's statement of 16 April?

"We are not prepared to take anyone at their word ... We ourselves do not ask that we should be taken at our word". (ENDC/PV.21, page 27)

In other words, it is agreed that the nature of international control must be such as would provide firm assurance.

I turn to another part of the paragraph which Mr. Dean quoted -- and quoted because he was pointing out to us its basic importance to the subject of control. Indeed it is the basic document on control or verification. The part I am referring to now reads:

"... the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage". (ENDC/5, page 2)

There is something in Mr. Zorin's statement which I think corresponds quite closely to this:

"The idea that every disarmament measure should be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verifying that measure is expressed in paragraph 2, article 2, of the Soviet draft treaty." (ENDC/PV.21, page 31)

That does not reproduce the part of paragraph 6 that Mr. Dean read into the record, but it is again sufficiently near it to give us hope that it will be possible for the co-Chairmen to work on the documentation now before them with a view to producing for us a joint text. We hope very much that they will do so.

May I now return to the rest of Mr. Dean's statement and the statement of the Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, on the United States plan? We will refrain from any comment on these two aspects of the statements at this stage. We will come back to these statements with quite a number of comments and, we hope, with quite a number of detailed suggestions and ideas, when we come to discuss stage I measures. For the moment we have commented only on pre-stage-I measures. We are as concerned as the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union with two very important points which they have brought out today.

(Mr. Lall, India)

One point is the question of balance: that is to say, how paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles is to be implemented. Secondly, we are very much concerned -- and I believe this was the other important point that was brought out -- with the implementation of verification provisions as we proceed with the treaty. These are two major issues, and we will of course comment in detail on them later.

For the moment may I say that both statements which have been made, that is to say by Mr. Dean and by Mr. Zorin, raise questions in our mind on both these matters? I do not want to say this in any spirit of empty criticism or destructiveness. But, if they will forgive me for saying so, for any one view regarding what is a balanced plan in the field of general and complete disarmament, I believe it is possible for any analyst -- I am not talking of newspaper analysts; I mean a person given to analysis, and one must be very clear about the terms one uses -- to make a number of criticisms showing that the balance is not as good as it appears to be to the author of that particular plan. We will refrain from doing this at this stage, but it is a very important issue that I am raising, for this reason: I make bold to say that any plan brought forward to us might be unbalanced in some measure or other.

We must of course try to make the plan as balanced as possible. However, if I may say so, this point is important not only because of the intrinsic issue of balance but because it will be impossible to get theoretical balance unless there are other factors involved, namely, the application of the other principles: verification, confidence, a right political approach to this issue of disarmament. And I believe that it is of extreme importance in this question of balance to know how fast the plan is going to go. That is important, because you can teeter along, without falling down, on a tightrope which is 100 feet long, but if you ask someone to teeter along on a tightrope which is 50,000 feet long I am inclined to feel that the most expert tightrope walker would fall off. That means that the tightrope must not be too long. In a sense any disarmament plan is a tightrope. Let us not have too long a tightrope; otherwise we might fall off it, no matter how balanced we make the plan.

(Mr. Lall, India)

We will come back to that sort of consideration when we deal with specific issues. Meanwhile, in closing, may I express the hope that the co-Chairmen can put before us a document on the general disarmament obligations and verification matters with which we have been dealing? In fact, today I was rather hoping that we would have another of these documents before us, one dealing with disarmament obligations, and I was not very happily surprised to see that it was not before us. I thought the co-Chairmen had had quite a few days to do this since we last met, but I recognize that those days were possibly dedicated to other matters in life. I entirely agree that disarmament is not the only thing we have to do in life. However, I hope we will have some documents before us from the co-Chairmen in the very near future.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I, too, wish to thank the representatives of the United States of America and the Soviet Union for the very interesting statements they have made today, which I consider to be of capital importance for our work. We shall study them with the greatest care, but I think their complexity makes it quite understandable that we do not wish to state our views today, but reserve the right to speak on them later.

I should like to refer very briefly, however, to the method of work, which the representative of India mentioned just now. I think that, in substance, Mr. Zorin proposed that we should examine the Soviet draft treaty article by article, at the same time taking the corresponding paragraphs of the United States proposals into consideration. The representative of India, on the other hand, recommended examination on a practical basis, case by case. His proposal is certainly constructive, but I am afraid it might be rather difficult to put into effect. I should like to remind you, too, that at the beginning of our work the Italian delegation proposed examining the fundamental problems that arise, on the basis, naturally, of the documents submitted to us. That is a method of work which could, I believe, also be constructive.

I am sure we shall find the most appropriate method for the work we have to do. The spirit of co-operation which seems to me to prevail today gives us good reason to hope so.

I also wish to emphasize the importance the Italian delegation attaches to the early conclusion of an agreement on the first part of our disarmament plan. Mr. Zorin's statement today gives me hope that he will not be lacking in goodwill.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I can assure him that on our side goodwill is complete and that we have the most lively desire to make rapid progress. I am sure that the Western delegations will spare no effort to that end.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): The representative of India suggested just now that we might perhaps conclude our discussion of the article dealing with the obligations of States in regard to control. I do not know whether that is the view of the Committee and, in particular, of our two co-Chairmen. I should therefore like to put the following question, mainly to the two co-Chairmen but also to the other representatives: do they consider that the time has come to conclude our discussion on this matter and perhaps to fix a time-limit for the submission of any relevant amendments, in accordance with the procedure previously adopted?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I think that today's statements on questions relating to the part of the draft treaty concerned with general provisions on control have already provided enough material to enable us to try and find a common position and to draw up these provisions, bearing in mind that there is a separate article on this subject and that there are relevant proposals both in the previous document submitted by the United States and in the new document which has just been circulated, containing an outline of a draft treaty.

Therefore, unless other members wish to speak specifically on these questions, perhaps it would be appropriate, if my United States colleague agrees, for us as co-Chairmen to try to set out these general provisions on control in a joint proposal, so that we could make further progress towards drawing up a single draft treaty in which these general provisions on control will be embodied. Needless to say, this does not exclude, but presupposes further consideration of questions of control as applied to specific stages and disarmament measures. It is my understanding that what Mr. Dean had in mind today was that, during the examination, say, of the first stage of disarmament, a study will be made not only of the disarmament measures themselves but also of the measures of control that will be required for the supervision, for the implementation of these disarmament measures. This will, of course, be done later.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Therefore, unless other Committee members wish to raise some particular point relating to this part of our draft treaty, it seems to me that it would be useful to recommend that the two co-Chairmen should consider the concrete proposals already before us on this subject and should submit to the other members of the Committee by a specific time-limit any observations or any amendments which they consider necessary for the improvement of the text submitted.

This is, I think, what is indicated by the course of our discussions. As members of the Conference know, items are accumulating for us to deal with as co-Chairmen, since we have not yet presented a joint proposal on article 1 of the treaty, which sets out general obligations relating to a disarmament programme and a number of general principles. There are already proposals on this matter; there are proposals not only by the United States and the Soviet Union, but also by some other States which have submitted additional proposals. I think that within the next few days we shall be able to submit our ideas with or without parentheses, as the representative of India has put it, so as to give members of the Committee an opportunity of exchanging views on the joint proposals already submitted. This is the first step. The next step, I think, is to deal with questions of control.

Therefore, if my United States colleague has no objection, we might today fix a deadline for the submission by any delegations wishing to do so of suggestions and ideas relating to general questions of control, so that we could also examine these suggestions together with the United States delegation, and perhaps present our proposals on the two matters, namely, on general obligations relating to disarmament and then on questions of control.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): Could we now have the views of the other co-Chairman?

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I listened with great interest to Mr. Zorin earlier this morning and I would naturally like to study very carefully what he said. I also listened with great interest to the representatives of Canada and India.

I pointed out earlier this morning that the United States paper which has been circulated as "Part I, Objectives and Principles" (ENDC/18) covers some of our ideas on the points dealt with by the representative of the Soviet Union in

(Mr. Dean, United States)

discussing articles 2 and 3, as well as article 1, of the Soviet draft treaty, I had understood that my Soviet colleague might wish to go on to discuss article 3 of the Soviet draft treaty. We would be quite glad to hear him on that. It occurs to us that perhaps that should come before we start getting together on the joint draft of all of part I.

The representative of Italy also said this morning, as I understood him, that he wanted to study what Mr. Zorin had to say; perhaps other representatives would like to speak. But as far as we are concerned we would of course be quite agreeable to begin drafting all of part I if no other representative wishes to speak further on this subject and if my Soviet colleague agrees.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I merely wish to ask, in regard to Part I of the disarmament plan, whether the two co-Chairmen propose to convene a sub-committee or group consisting of the proposers of amendments. That procedure was followed in dealing with measures against war propaganda, and I should like to know whether it is also to be applied to Part I of the disarmament plan.

About control, which we considered this morning, I think that although we are anxious to have a text before us soon, delegations could usefully reflect at leisure on the statements we have heard this morning, with a view to submitting amendments or proposals if necessary. Consequently, if the Committee decides to fix a time-limit, I should like it to be a fairly long one, so as to give us the necessary time for consideration and for drafting amendments.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If my understanding of the United States representative's statement is correct, he has no objection to our beginning to draft proposals relating to both articles 1 and 2. It is true that he has suggested that it might perhaps be advisable to hear views on article 3 of our draft, as it also deals with general questions. We have no objection to hearing views on this section of Part I also.

But I think that this should not delay our work on articles 1 and 2. We could surely proceed as follows: we could, say, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow -- we will reach agreement on this -- make explanatory statements on article 3 of our draft and exchange views on this matter, while at the same time we could start preparing proposals relating to articles 1 and 2. We could fix a time-limit now for the submission of views on article 2.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

It seems to me that all these views or proposals could be submitted not later than, say, Thursday or Friday. I think that this period will be sufficient since the documents were submitted some time back, we have had an opportunity of studying them and we ought to speed up our work.

Therefore, if the representative of Italy has no objection, we might agree that Friday should be the deadline for submitting amendments and additional proposals relating to questions of control.

As for article 3, which deals with measures for consolidating peace, I think that the deadline for presenting amendments and suggestions on this article may have to be fixed after we have discussed it.

The Italian representative has asked whether or not we are to meet with those who have submitted amendments. I think that this is a matter that will be decided by the United States co-Chairman and myself and we shall then inform the countries concerned. I think that at the moment we must take a more concrete approach; we must see what sort of amendments and proposals are involved and then take a decision.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): (The suggestions made by the representative of the Soviet Union are quite acceptable to my own delegation, and, if it is agreeable to the representative of Italy, I think that the two co-Chairmen could, after examining the various proposals made, work out an appropriate procedure for hearing the views of the various representatives on this matter.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): If there are no further comments, I will conclude that there is general agreement between the co-Chairmen, and tacit agreement by the members of the Committee, to set a time-limit today for the submission of amendments to the paragraph on control. We could at the same time continue the discussion of article 3 of the Soviet draft and of the corresponding sections of the United States draft, which are to some extent connected with the problem of control. If everyone agrees, we might set Thursday or Friday as the last day for submitting amendments. We could by then perhaps conclude the discussion in the committee on the subsequent items, which would facilitate the drafting of the articles on control. As regards the question of inviting the members of the Committee to discuss the amendments, as has just been suggested (and as was done, incidentally, in the case of the item on war propaganda) we will leave that to the co-Chairmen.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I entirely agree and hope that the two co-Chairmen will decide to follow the procedure already adopted in another case.

I wish to make one other remark, however. To help us in our studies and in submitting amendments, it might perhaps be advisable to tell us clearly which are the texts that will be examined by the two co-Chairmen in the stage immediately following. Mr. Zorin mentioned article 2 on "Control Obligations", but unless I am mistaken we have not agreed to take the text proposed by the Soviet delegation as the sole basis for our work. I should therefore like to know which are the corresponding passages in the draft submitted by the United States delegation.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): In reply to the representative of Italy, I believe that part I of the United States draft, headed "Objectives and Principles" (ENDC/18), covers the points dealt with by Mr. Zorin in discussing articles 2 and 3. I think those would be the corresponding texts on which proposals or amendments should be made.

It was my understanding that the time-limit which Mr. Zorin mentioned was Friday, and that is quite acceptable to us.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I take it that the United States representative's reply satisfies the representative of Italy.

Mr. Zorin suggested Thursday or Friday as the final date. That is why I said we must choose between Thursday and Friday. I do not think it is a very important point.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): As the United States representative has made it clear that United States proposals corresponding to all three articles submitted by us are contained in Part I of the United States draft, entitled "Objectives and Principles", I can assume that no further document will be submitted by the United States relating to these three sections of our plan. Therefore I think we could perhaps fix the deadline for the submission of amendments to these three articles of our draft and to part I of the United States draft for Friday, so that we could finish off the first part of the draft treaty. I do not believe the United States representative will object to this, and it would mean that we would complete our work on the whole of the first part this week. If no one objects, we could so decide. We may give our comments on article 3 tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): We have now before us a new proposal, which seems to me to simplify the matter. I see that the United States representative agrees. We can therefore decide on Friday of this week at 10 a.m. as the time-limit for the submission of amendments to all of Part I of the Soviet draft and the corresponding parts of the United States draft.

If there are no objections, it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twenty-sixth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. M. Naszkowski, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, India and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 25 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.